



“Above all else, we need a reaffirmation of political commitment at the highest levels to reducing the dangers that arise both from existing nuclear weapons and from further proliferation.”¹

Topic History

Since the inception of the United Nations (UN), nuclear weapons and non-proliferation have been at the forefront of its agenda, particularly within the General Assembly First Committee, Disarmament and International Security (DISEC). Along with the DISEC there are several other UN bodies that deal with the issues of international peace and security, the most authoritative being the Security Council (UNSC).² The DISEC and UNSC work together to ensure that the provisions of the United Nations Charter and other international agreements are met.³

Numerous conventions and treaties have been negotiated in the arena of nuclear weapons, most notably the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). This treaty represents the most significant non-proliferation mechanism in the international community⁴, an international regime designed to halt the flow of nuclear weapons outside the original P5 nations.

The NPT also created safeguard mechanisms to be administrated by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).⁵ The IAEA conducts activities such as weapons inspections and stockpile maintenance inspections.⁶

There are other non-proliferation measures that work in tandem with the NPT, such as the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

(CTBT).⁷ The problem in the international community, though, is not that there are no effective enforcement mechanisms, it is that the mechanisms are simply not taken seriously by the international community itself. Several nuclear States now exist outside of the realm of what the NPT allows.⁸ North Korea, Iran, India, and Pakistan have openly admitted to developing nuclear weapons, and Israel has had a nuclear reactor at the Negev Center for Nuclear Research (CNR) in Dimona since 1958 (created with the help of a recognised nuclear power: France), along with several other nuclear research centres in the country.⁹ Most scholars and policymakers believe that Israel possesses capabilities far beyond that which would be considered under the NPT as peaceful uses of their nuclear technology.¹⁰

The 1996 CTBT is one measure that was intended to strengthen the arm of non-proliferation in the international community.¹¹ However, many UN Member States refuse to become party to it, because it lacks the means for the elimination of weapons stockpiles within an agreed timeframe.¹² In 1998, after a round of international negotiations, the Conference on Disarmament (CD), decided to enter, once again, the arena of disarmament measures by beginning negotiations on the Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). This would put in place a mechanism for the non-distribution of nuclear weapons materials (not including plutonium or highly enriched uranium, or HEU, for non-explosive

¹ Annan, *Secretary-General's Millennium Assembly Report*, 2000, Section IV: Freedom from Fear.

² United Nations, *Functions and Powers of the General Assembly*.

³ United Nations, *Functions and Powers of the General Assembly*.

⁴ United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)*, 2002.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ United Nations Department of Disarmament Affairs, *Weapons of Mass Destruction Branch of the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs*, 2008.

⁸ Suleman, *Bargaining in the Shadow of Violence: The NPT, IAEA, and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Negotiations*, 2008, p. 206.

⁹ International Atomic Energy Agency, *Nuclear Research in Israel*, 2003.

¹⁰ International Atomic Energy Agency, *Nuclear Research in Israel*, 2003.

¹¹ United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, *Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty*, 2002; Preparatory Commission for the

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty Organization, *CTBT Moves World Closer to Being Free of Nuclear Weapons*, says UN Secretary-General, 2006.

¹² *Ibid.*



purposes).¹³ Important to the background of the CD is that every geographic and political region is represented as well as every known nuclear power or countries, which are suspected to hold the status of nuclear power.¹⁴ Like the CTBT, though, the FMCT has been met with considerable scepticism and criticism, delaying the negotiations and any clear advancement on the subject.¹⁵ The FMCT, meant to work alongside the CTBT and strengthen the non-proliferation measures that already exist, has not entered into force but would be a useful tool for reducing and eventually eliminating the threat of nuclear warfare.¹⁶

The members of the accepted international nuclear weapons regime are expected to reduce their stockpiles to eventual elimination from their arsenals.¹⁷ The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) published a report in 2004 about the new nuclear regime and the current crisis that faces the international community.¹⁸ The report details some of the main problems facing the international community with regards to nuclear weapons, including the emerging new world order, and the politics and interests that are helping to form this new world order.¹⁹ These politics are increasingly mercurial. The UNIDIR's report writer, John Simpson, a former member of the UN Secretary-General's advisory board on disarmament measures, describes the polarity forming in the international community, with particular regard to how each State views disarmament. Simpson states that there are two basic approaches to State disarmament measures.²⁰ The first is fuelled by an anarchical system that relies on the protection of mutual self-interest; the

second is reliant on common values and goals.²¹ Simpson makes the case that it could be either of these situations presented in his dichotomy.²² In the States that practice one or the other, however, the position would be a more centred approach that would moderate the arms management and disarmament policies used in the States that practice them (Simpson points to the United States).²³ Simpson also makes a bold Statement about these dichotomies, stating, "The use of raw power without legitimacy generates the anarchy it may be claiming to moderate. Arms management based on universality and non-discrimination will fail without effective non-compliance mechanisms."²⁴ This assertion makes the two approaches to arms management much more interesting, then: The norms and values of the international community are explicitly at odds with the strategies used for disarmament.

Problems Behind the Problem

Problems with the Existing Nuclear Regime

One of the problems the international community currently faces in their efforts to curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons is that the NPT allows for the possession of items that can be used either for peaceful or non-peaceful purposes, otherwise known as dual-use items.²⁵ One such dual-use item is HEU.²⁶

These materials, as per the NPT, must meet IAEA safeguard procedures in order to be possessed by non-nuclear States and to be used for peaceful purposes, such as nuclear energy or research.²⁷ Evolving technologies and difficulties with regards to monitoring of the usage of all such materials has led to significant abuses in the area of dual-use items.

¹³ Federation of American Scientists, *Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty*.

¹⁴ [http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/\(httpPages\)/6286395D9F8DABA380256EF70073A846?OpenDocument](http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/6286395D9F8DABA380256EF70073A846?OpenDocument)

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ Chow, Speier, and Jones, *The Proposed Fissile Material Production Cut-off: Next Steps*, 1995.

¹⁷ Simpson, *The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime: back to the future?*, 2004, pp. 5-7.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 5-7.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 5-7.

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 5-7.

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 5-7.

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 5-7.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 5-7.

²⁵ United Nations, *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)*, 1968, Article IV.

²⁶ General Accounting Office, *Controlling Exports of Dual-Use Nuclear-Related Equipment* [Report], 1983.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, Article 3.



Many States have joined collaborative international coalitions to help control the spread of such dual-use items.²⁸ One such regime, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), seeks to curb the proliferation of dual-use items through export controls and a stringent list of controlled items.²⁹ This list includes complete missile systems and overtly weapons related materials (such as propulsion materials), but some of the items that are carefully controlled by the participating MTCR countries are not as obviously used for non-peaceful purposes.³⁰

The MTCR classifies items into two categories: Category I materials are the materials that have no use but weaponry; and Category II items are software, technology, and development items.³¹ These categories are further defined in the MTCR Technical Appendix, which not only defines each item, but goes so far to define the differences between basic scientific research, development, and other programmes.³²

The MTCR is just one organisation that focuses on export controls such as this one, and even with such stringent controls it remains difficult to halt the flow of the controlled items that may be used to create a nuclear weapon. Another body that focuses on export controls is the United States Bureau of Industry and Security (a bureau of the U.S. Department of Commerce) that also lists items that are considered dual-use technologies.³³ This list is called the Commerce Control List (CCL) and includes common items such as telecommunication devices and computers.³⁴ Many of the items that are carefully watched by these export control groups are used for medical research,

nuclear energy, and basic scientific research.³⁵ The MTCR has attempted to monitor the usage of such items by encouraging its members to have regular dialogue with their trading partners and to implement export licensing and policy guidelines.³⁶

Problems concerning a possible extension of the current nuclear free zones of Africa, Oceania, South America and some of central Asia are often encountered on bases of conflicts of interest on a national level. Conversely, issues concerning the treatment of countries that try to obtain nuclear power status, in addition to the original five nuclear powers, are subject to controversy and debate. For these reasons further negotiation in the realm of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is fraught with difficulty and warrants urgent attention.

New Approaches to Non-Proliferation

A apparent failure of the NPT centres around the fact that it only allows for five States to possess nuclear weapons. Not only a glaring relic of the world order of the 1950's, there are presently an additional four States known to possess nuclear weapons (India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel).³⁷

The CTBT sought to fill in these policy gaps; however, the reluctance of many States to sign onto it has led to its perceived failure in the realm of non-proliferation.³⁸ The UN has said on numerous occasions that instability on a regional level helps create arms races that start small and end up with a bargaining game for bigger items, highlighting the need for the CTBT and other control regimes.³⁹ In 2000, the GA adopted *A/RES/55/567*, which again highlighted the importance of the CTBT

²⁸ United States Bureau of Industry and Security, *Multilateral Export Regimes*.

²⁹ Missile Technology Control Regime, *The Missile Technology Control Regime*.

³⁰ Missile Technology Control Regime, *Equipment, Software and Technology Annex*, 2008.

³¹ United States Bureau of Industry and Security, *Export Control Basics (Exporting 101)*.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ Suleman, *Bargaining in the Shadow of Violence: The NPT, IAEA, and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Negotiations*, 2008, p. 207.

³⁸ Blix, *CTBT: Going the Last Mile to Banish Nuclear Weapons Testing*, 2007.

³⁹ United Nations, *Security for Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, Ballistic Missile Proliferation Addressed in Disarmament Committee Draft Texts*, 2005.



and fervently urged all non-willing Member States to sign onto it.⁴⁰

The proposed Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) is one way the international community can work to curb the illicit proliferation of nuclear weapons.⁴¹ Its aims go beyond dual-use items and recommend the reduction and eventual elimination of the substances that can be used to produce nuclear weapons.⁴² General Assembly Resolution *A/RES/48/75, General and Complete Disarmament* calls for the creation of such a treaty, and recognises the links between deterred development and the proliferation of nuclear weapons, as well as the possession of fissile materials.⁴³

The James Martin Center for Non-Proliferation Studies (CNS), a non-governmental organisation that brings together non-proliferation experts from all over the world, has published numerous reports on the inherent problems of the current nuclear weapons regime.⁴⁴ The Monterey Non-Proliferation Strategy Group is a working group of experts that is part of a collaborative effort of the CNS and recently revived their discussion concerning the international nuclear weapons regime.⁴⁵ They call not only for a renewed commitment to the NPT but also a search for common ground that could bring the NPT back into the view of the international community and strengthen its role as a non-proliferation measure.⁴⁶ A report written by the Monterey Non-Proliferation Strategy Group, *Strengthening the Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime: Searching for Common Ground*, details some

⁴⁰ United Nations General Assembly, *Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty*, (A/RES/55/567), 2000.

⁴¹ Federation of American Scientists, *Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty*.

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ *Ibid.*; United Nations General Assembly, *General and Complete Disarmament* (A/RES/48/75), 1993.

⁴⁴ James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, *Monterey Non-Proliferation Strategy Group*, 2008.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

of the problems with the current regime.⁴⁷ This report makes interesting claims relating to verification and inspection of nuclear weapons programmes, and states also that detection of violations and diversions . a key aspect of verification . is often dependent on national intelligence transfers. Given the nature of, and the limited means available to, international organisations such as the IAEA, it cannot be expected that these organisations should have greater access to information and be authorised to use it as freely as national intelligence services would.⁴⁸

The IAEA is the world's centre of cooperation in the nuclear field. It was set up as the world'sAtoms for Peaceorganisation in 1957 within the UN family.⁴⁹ One of the main duties of the IAEA is the inspection, safeguarding and verification of nuclear materials. In order to accomplish this goal, they have established agreements for inspections and safeguards compliance in over 145 countries today, and they use this to complete their verification programmes.⁵⁰ The IAEA has special safeguards protocols and action plans, as well as special outreach programmes to ensure that the goals of the UN, NPT, and IAEA are being met.⁵¹

In an effort to support the role of the IAEA the DISEC has continually reaffirmed support for the organisation and its work. The IAEA has many areas of focus, although there are Member States that receive or have received more scrutiny than others, including Iran, Libya, North Korea, and Iraq.⁵² The Safeguards Action Plan and the international agreements, such as the NPT, are the IAEA's main tools in weapons and nuclear programme inspections.⁵³ Some States

⁴⁷ Monterey Non-Proliferation Strategy Group, *Strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime: Searching for Common Ground*, 2006.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

⁴⁹ International Atomic Energy Agency, *About IAEA*.

⁵⁰ International Atomic Energy Agency, *Our Work: Verification*.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ *Ibid.*



believe that in order to improve the nuclear control regime it is necessary to strengthen and promote the work of the IAEA and particularly their safeguard system; others point to the need to strengthen capacity of the IAEA to verify nuclear activities that have been declared by a state, and to further their ability to detect illicit nuclear programmes as well.

Situation involving North Korea within the Framework of the NPT

North Korea first announced its decision to withdraw from its obligations to the NPT on March 12, 1993.⁵⁴ At the time North Korea withdrew, it was planning to conduct ~~Team Spirit~~ military exercises, which would directly contradict the demands of the IAEA to inspect two specific sites.⁵⁵ On June 11, 1993, one day before its withdrawal was to take effect, negotiations between North Korea and the United States resulted in North Korea suspending the ~~effectuation~~ of their withdrawal from the NPT and accepting normal IAEA inspections of seven facilities, particularly in Yongbyon.⁵⁶ This led to North Korea and the United States signing an Agreed Framework in which North Korea conceded to forsake nuclear ambitions in return for the construction of two light water reactors and oil shipments from the United States to North Korea as agreed upon in Geneva on October 21, 1994.⁵⁷

On January 10, 2003, North Korea once again notified the UNSC of its intention to withdraw from the Treaty after North Korea was accused of not having met their obligations with the IAEA.⁵⁸ On the following day, North Korea claimed that it had suspended its 1994 withdrawal from the NPT on the last day of the required three-month period as stated in Article X.⁵⁹ Therefore, North Korea refused to give additional notice

to the States party to the treaty and the UNSC.⁶⁰ On January 12, 2003, the IAEA Board of Governors passed a resolution (GOV/2003/3) declaring that North Korea was in further non-compliance with obligations under the Safeguards Agreement of the NPT and would report the actions of North Korea to the GA and the UNSC.⁶¹ April 10, 2003 is commonly accepted as the date on which North Korea officially withdrew from the NPT.⁶² Subsequently, negotiations have taken place, involving North Korea, the United States of America, and the Peoples Republic of China, the Russian Federation, Japan, and South Korea.⁶³ These negotiations have come to become known as the Six Party Talks.⁶⁴

Talks about halting North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons have provided positive and negative strides in curbing North Korea's nuclear ambition.⁶⁵ North Korea announced on October 9, 2006 that it had successfully carried out its first nuclear weapon test.⁶⁶ In February 2007, a deal was struck where North Korea agreed to take the first steps towards disarmament.⁶⁷ As a result, on July 16, 2007 the IAEA verified that North Korea had shut down Yongbyon as part of the agreement it had reached to dismantle its nuclear weapons programme.⁶⁸ The six party talks have advanced in the following years, though the Yongbyon reactor was reactivated and on April 25, 2009 and a month later the North Korea announced to have performed a second successful nuclear test. This was seen by the international community as a violation of the UNSC 1718 (2006) and led to a halt of further talks.⁶⁹

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶³ The American Journal of International Law, *U.S. and Other Powers Reach Tentative Understanding on North Korea's Nuclear Program*, 2005.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ British Broadcasting Corporation, *Timeline: North Korea Nuclear Stand-Off*, n.d.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹ United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1718, 2006

⁵⁴ United Nations Department of Public Information, *2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty*, 2005.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*



Situation involving Iran within the Framework of the NPT

Iran has both signed and ratified the NPT, insisting that it is currently acting within the boundaries of the NPT and, in particular, Article IV.⁷⁰ Their claim of peaceful usage of nuclear facilities however has been questioned by a number of States party to the NPT.⁷¹ They point out Iran hiding its Arak nuclear facility and its refusal to allow IAEA inspectors to verify that it is complying with the Additional Protocol adds to the suspicion that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons.⁷²

Like the situation involving North Korea, Iran has been involved in negotiations with concerned States including France, Germany, and the United Kingdom since 2004.⁷³ These negotiations produced an agreement, which led to a temporary suspension of Iran's uranium enrichment and reprocessing programme.⁷⁴ Since then, Iran has been targeted by a number of UNSC Resolutions meant to force Iran to cooperate and make its nuclear ambitions and intentions clear.⁷⁵ In accordance with several intelligence organisations it is assumed, that the nuclear program of the Iran was put on hold as of mid-2007, though the precise current status is unknown and hence cause for dispute.

The Future

The UN has done considerable work to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. There are many unstable regions in the international community, and unfortunately, there is either one or more State in each area

⁷⁰ House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation, *Previewing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Conference*, 2005.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² *Ibid.*

⁷³ The American Journal of International Law, *Iran Nuclear Program*, 2005.

⁷⁴ The Economist, *The Riddle of Iran, Special Report: The Revolution Strikes Back*, 2007.

⁷⁵ British Broadcasting Corporation, *Iran and the Nuclear Issue*, 2007.

seeking to gain non-peaceful nuclear capabilities. The UN and many other international organisations strive to provide new and useful ways to stem the flow of nuclear weapons, particularly to conflict-ridden regions, but it is impossible to prevent the acquisition, spread, and development of nuclear weapons completely. The NPT, the CTBT and the FMCT are important first steps but it has been shown that there is still more that needs to be done to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons throughout the globe. In an effort to determine the next steps, below are questions to answer moving forward.

Points Resolutions Should Address

The following questions would need to be addressed in any document targeting the question of non-proliferation in the current global political climate:

- What is functional and has proven effective of the treaties and other measures already in place?
- Can current organisations be restructured or empowered by the GA to do a more efficient and effective job?
- The DISEC has been an active participant in negotiations up to this point. How can the role of the DISEC continue and be enhanced?
- What further steps should the DISEC take to further non-proliferation efforts?
- Why have nuclear weapons continued to proliferate around the globe in spite of the NPT and other treaties?
- Is your country a member of any regional organisation dedicated to discussing the threat of nuclear weapons?
- The establishment of Nuclear Weapons Free Zones (NWFZs) proved to be an effective way to stabilise regions with disputed nuclear status. Is your country a member of a NWFZ treaty? If not, is there a treaty within your region and why are you not a member of it?
- What can be done to further enhance the NWFZs throughout the globe?
- How can the DISEC work to enhance NWFZs?



- Are there opportunities for DISEC to establish or to work as a mediator in non-proliferation questions?
- What active measures and sanctions can be used to prevent further spread of nuclear arms and what incentives can be given to dismantle nuclear arsenals?

Bibliography

American Society of International Law. (2005 January). Iran Nuclear Programme. *The American Journal of International Law*, 99(1). Retrieved June 17, 2009, from JSTOR database.

The article talks about Iran's nuclear programme and the events that were occurring involving Iran and its nuclear programme during 2003-2004. Of importance is the discussion of Iran engaged in negotiations with European powers with regards to its uranium enrichment programme in order to seek a solution before any action were to be taken by the UNSC.

American Society of International Law. (2005 October). U.S. and Other Powers Reach Tentative Understanding on North Korea's Nuclear Programme. *The American Journal of International Law*, 99(4). Retrieved June 17, 2009 from JSTOR database.

The article is an excellent source for delegates as it looks into what had been the latest rounds of Six Party Talks with regards to North Korea's nuclear weapons programme. Of importance for delegates are the sections in which light-water reactor and other issues like the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula are mentioned and its nuclear weapons programme.

Annan, K. (2000, March 7). *Secretary-General's Millennium Assembly Report*. Report presented at the UN. New York, New York.

Former Secretary-General Kofi Annan's report to the Millennium Assembly in 2000 had several sections that addressed specific goals that he wanted addressed by the UN as part of the Millennium Development Goals. Section IV, called "Freedom from Fear" was directed

specifically at the failures of the international community to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction and the failure of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and other international documents that are aimed at keeping the balance of the nuclear regime.

BBC News Online. (n.d.). Q&A: *Iran and the Nuclear Issue*. Retrieved June 17, 2009 from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4031603.stm

The article provides delegates with an understanding in the form of a question and answer piece in explaining the current situation in which the IAEA, UNSC and the international community are currently faced with in regards to Iran. Delegates will learn about the current position of each of the main players ranging from where the IAEA stands with regards to Iran and its actions or lack of, Iran's position on enrichment, and host of other positions related to the issue of Iran and its possible pursuit of nuclear weapons.

BBC News Online. (n.d.) *Timeline: North Korea Nuclear Stand-Off*. Retrieved June 17, 2009 from

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2604437.stm>

The timeline provides an overview of events involving North Korea and its pursuit of nuclear weapons since 2002. Beginning with 2002, the timeline chronicles all the major events, the positive outcomes and the negative setbacks that have occurred with North Korea and the other five States involved in the Six Party Talks, as well as the IAEA during the last five years when considerable efforts have been made to encourage North Korea to end its pursuit of nuclear weapons.

Blix, H. (2007, July). *CTBT: Going the Last Mile to Banish Nuclear Weapons Testing*. Retrieved June 17, 2009, from

http://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/content/reference/outreach/ctbto_spectrum_10/p6_7_Cover_story.pdf

Hans Blix is an internationally renowned scholar and UN weapons inspector. In this article he wrote for the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-



Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), Blix outlines the problems that the negotiations for the CTBT have encountered. Blix also highlights the importance and urgency of ratifying the CTBT.

Bureau of Industry and Security, United States Department of Commerce. (n.d.). *Multilateral Export Regimes*. Retrieved June 17, 2009, from

<http://www.bis.doc.gov/policiesandregulations/multilateralexportregimes.htm>

The United States Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) website is useful for understanding how export controls function in the international trade regime. This particular section of the website shows how different export control regimes function, including the already mentioned Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The others listed here are the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Australia Group, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. These regimes also focus on nuclear dual-use technologies that can be dangerous if put to the right use.

Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, TS No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153.

The Charter of the United Nations is the foundation document of the UN and therefore, all delegates should familiarise themselves with the principles enshrined in it. Of particular relevance is Chapter IV, which lays out the specific duties and powers of the General Assembly. Understanding the duties and reach of the General Assembly will assist you as a delegate in focusing their research.

Chow, B. G., Speier, R. H., & Jones, G. S. (1995). *The Proposed Fissile Material Production Cutoff: Next Steps (Monograph)*. Retrieved June 17, 2009, from

http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR586-1/index.html

This report, published by the Rand Corporation in 1995, provides an in depth look at the proposed Fissile Materials Cutoff Treaty. The writers use a policy-oriented focus that looks at what the FMCT would do and how it would affect the proliferation of nuclear materials. They analyse the materials themselves (both plutonium and highly enriched uranium, HEU), and the policies proposed and whether

or not a document such as the FMCT would actually hinder the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

du Preez, Jean. (2005, April 28). Testimony to the House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation. Retrieved June 17, 2009 from

<http://cns.miis.edu/testimony/dupreez.htm>

The presentation in front of the subcommittee is a valuable source as it outlines and describes what is seen as some of the major flaws with the NPT as a treaty and what are some of the deficiencies as it relates to the effectiveness of the NPT. It is made clear that there is an inability to force compliance with NPT making reference to the situation with North Korea and poses the question about how to prevent more withdrawals from the treaty. In addition, it address the weakness related to Article IV of the NPT can be seen as an inalienable right or a potential loophole for States who may wish not to comply with the treaty in the future.

Federation of American Scientists. (n.d.). *Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty*. Retrieved June 17, 2009, from

<http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/fmct/>

The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) has provided this site as an introduction to the proposed Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty. This page also provides links to other sites that detail the history of negotiations and proposals for the FMCT. The FAS also neatly summarises the chronology of the FMCT.

General Accounting Office. (1983, September 29). *Controlling Exports of Dual-Use Nuclear-Related Equipment*. Retrieved June 17, 2009, from

<http://archive.gao.gov/f0102/122594.pdf>

The General Accounting Office, which is now known as the Government Accountability Office, or GAO, is known as the "Congressional Watchdog." They write reports on the business and politics of the United States Congress, and this one details the need for stricter controls on dual use



technologies. This report also focuses on how export controls can assist in curtailing the proliferation of these hard to track items.

International Atomic Energy Agency. (n.d.). *About IAEA*. Retrieved June 17, 2009, from <http://www.iaea.org/About/index.html>

This website is an introduction to the IAEA and it's work in the field of nuclear weapons inspection. The IAEA is the premier agency that works in conjunction with the United Nations to ensure that all of the established safeguards are met and followed. The IAEA uses its statute to create guidelines in three main areas: safety and security, safeguards and verification, and science and technology.

International Atomic Energy Agency. (n.d.). *Our Work: Verification*. Retrieved June 17, 2009, from

<http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/index.html>

The 'Verification' section of the IAEA website is dedicated to explaining how the safeguards mechanisms work within the IAEA. The IAEA is one of the biggest nuclear weapons inspections organisations in the international community. They work closely with the United Nations to ensure that compliance mechanisms are met.

International Atomic Energy Agency. (2003). *Nuclear Research in Israel*. Retrieved June 17, 2009, from

http://www.iaea.org/inisnkm/nkm/ws/research_institutes/israel.html

The International Atomic Energy Agency's Nuclear Energy Handbook provides facts and lists facilities that contribute to a State's nuclear research programmes. This page is dedicated to Israel's programme, and upon further research, links are provided to Israeli government pages such as the Israel Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) and others. This listing is also a link to many other resources regarding nuclear power.

James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. (2008). *Monterey Nonproliferation Strategy Group*. Retrieved June 17, 2009, from

<http://cns.miis.edu/research/mnsg/>

The Monterey Institute is home to one of the most renowned nuclear non-proliferation study programmes. The Institute also

houses the Monterey Nonproliferation Strategy Group, which puts on conferences and hosts debate regarding the international nuclear weapons regime. This website is dedicated to their reports and findings and is a good resource for getting acquainted with the current dialogue on nuclear non-proliferation.

Missile Technology Control Regime. (n.d.). *The Missile Technology Control Regime*. Retrieved June 17, 2009, from

<http://www.mtcr.info/english/index.html>

This website is an introduction to the organisation that is made up of thirty-four countries that have export controls on dual-use items. The goal of the MTCR is to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons materials by using stricter export controls. The MTCR is a loose collaborative effort that encourages policy driven solutions to halting the flow of materials that can be used for nuclear weapons development.

Missile Technology Control Regime. (n.d.). *Objectives of the Missile Technology Control Regime*. Retrieved June 17, 2009, from

<http://www.mtcr.info/english/objectives.html>

The Objectives section of the MTCR's website details the actions and attempts at export controls on nuclear capable materials, and also gives a mission statement. The main objective of the MTCR is to not only utilise export controls, but also to hold regular meetings and encourage its members to dialogue frequently and openly to discourage the use of dual-use items for nuclear weaponry.

Missile Technology Control Regime. (2008, January 9). *Equipment, Software and Technology Annex*. Retrieved June 17, 2009 from

<http://www.mtcr.info/english/annex.html>

The Equipment, Software and Technology Annex, published by the MTCR, is a report that seeks to classify items that can be used both for peaceful uses as well as for the development of nuclear weapons systems. This annex provides useful definitions and categories that assist its 34 members to making useful export policy controls and guidelines for trading items that have the



potential to be used for nuclear weapons systems.

Monterey Nonproliferation Strategy Group. (2006, November). *Strengthening the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: Searching for Common Ground*. Retrieved June 17, 2009, from

http://cns.miiis.edu/research/mnsg/pdfs/0611_mnsg_report.pdf

Strengthening the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: Searching for Common Ground is a report published by the Monterey Non-Proliferation Strategy Group. This report details the role of non-proliferation measures at local, regional, and international levels. It also provides prescriptive suggestions for policymakers on how to ensure that nuclear non-proliferation is at the forefront of their agendas.

Nuclear Threat Initiative. (2004, April). *Israel Nuclear Facilities: Overview of Organizations and Facilities*. Retrieved June 17, 2009, from

http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Israel/Nuclear/3583.html

Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) is a research-based organisation that focuses its efforts on tracking the progress (or lack thereof) of the dismantling of the nuclear regime as it exists currently. NTI also publishes country profiles that detail the known factors of certain nuclear programmes. NTI also posts facts on chemical and biological weapons, as well as providing press updates and current events.

Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty Organization. (2007, September 17). *CTBT Moves World Closer to Being Free of Nuclear Weapons, says UN Secretary-General*. Retrieved June 17, 2009 from

<http://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/press-releases/2007/ctbt-moves-world-closer-to-being-free-of-nuclear-weapons-says-un-secretary-general/>

The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) works to further the goals of the CTBT and its design. This press release by Ban Ki-Moon discusses the CTBT and how it would assist the international community in obtaining a nuclear weapons

free world. The honourable Secretary General specifically highlights the nuclear test completed by North Korea in 2006, stating that this should be the world's last nuclear test and urged all Members that have not yet ratified the CTBT to do so immediately.

Simpson, J. (2004). *The Nuclear Non Proliferation Regime: Back to the future?* [Report]. Retrieved June 17, 2009, from <http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2015.pdf>

John Simpson's report for the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs is highly in depth regarding the consequences of how disarmament is approached by the United Nations Member States. The report is unique because Simpson tackles one of the most important issues facing the international community today: What changes have taken place since the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was signed that are affecting how we view non-proliferation today? Simpson also analyses policy and structure, examining what needs to change to really needs to happen in the nuclear regime to ensure that proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is halted.

Suleman, A. M. (2008). Bargaining in the Shadow of Violence: The NPT, IAEA, and Nuclear Non- Proliferation Negotiations. *Berkeley Journal of International Law*, 26(1), 206-253.

This article examines the current nuclear regime in the international community and envisions an out of control climate wherein any State that desires nuclear weapons shall have them. References to the nuclear tests completed by North Korea, India, and Pakistan and Iran's continued uranium enrichment programme only assist in proving that this is more than a likely reality in the coming years. The fact that the capabilities are growing in already destabilised areas only increases the fears that more States will try to develop nuclear capabilities on their own.

"The Revolution Strikes Back: The Riddle of Iran." (2007). *The Economist*.

The article goes into detail about Iran's political background which is fuelling the



current situation in which the IAEA and the international community is currently facing with Iran. In the article, there is a section which goes into depth about Iran's current uranium enrichment programme and where that currently stands and where it may currently head towards in the future.

United Nations. (1993). *The Relationship between Disarmament and Development (A/RES/48/75)*. Retrieved June 17, 2009, from <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/48/a48r075.htm>

This resolution is extremely important to the creation of a fissile materials cut-off agreement. Since no official document exists yet, this resolution is seminal to the development of such an agreement. To further the goals of the international community in creating a fissile materials cut-off agreement, this resolution highlights the impact of weapons acquisition on sustainable development.

United Nations. (2000). *Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (A/RES/55/567)*. Retrieved June 17, 2009, from <http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/r55.htm>

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has been under debate for some time in the international community. This resolution essentially calls for the debate to be reignited. The countries that have not yet expressed interest in signing are key to the success or failure of the CTBT.

United Nations. (2005, October 20). *Security for Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, Ballistic Missile Proliferation Addressed In Disarmament Committee Draft Texts*. Retrieved June 17, 2009, from <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/gadis3308.doc.htm>

Periodically the UN gives press updates about the current workings of a committee. This particular release concerns a working paper that came out of the DISEC concerning international nuclear policy. The results of the 2005 session of the DISEC reported in this press release are the commitments of certain Member States to the values of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

United Nations Department of Disarmament Affairs. (2008). *Weapons of Mass Destruction*. Retrieved June 17, 2009, from <http://www.un.org/disarmament/>

This website is a listing and explanation of the existing compliance mechanisms in the nuclear regime. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention) and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (Biological Weapons Convention) are listed here. There are also synopses regarding other weapons of mass destruction issues, such as missiles and terrorism.

United Nations Disarmament Commission. (2003, March 31). *'Creeping Retreat' From Nuclear Disarmament, Increased Proliferation Risk*. Retrieved June 17, 2009, from <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/dc2859.doc.htm>

From time to time the UN and its subsidiary bodies give press releases to keep the international community abreast of the discussions happening inside of working sessions. This 2003 release details the work of the Disarmament Commission and mentions the progress (or lack thereof) by the international community to disarm. It also mentions the fact that already volatile areas are becoming increasingly unstable due to the presence of nuclear weapons.

United Nations. General Assembly. 48th Session. (1993). *General and Complete Disarmament (A/RES/48/75)*. Retrieved June 17, 2009 from <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/48/a48r075.htm>

Under the heading of general and complete disarmament, the General Assembly covered a number of different topics related to disarmament in this resolution. Included in this resolution are separate sections addressing among other topics, the



Relationship between disarmament and development, bilateral nuclear arms negotiations and nuclear disarmament, general and complete disarmament, and Transparency in armaments. As controlling the proliferation of nuclear weapons is one part of the disarmament in general it is important to understand all the various facets of disarmament and how nuclear weapons fit in with other disarmament work.

United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. (2002). *Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty*. Retrieved June 17, 2009, from <http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/CTBT.shtml>

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is meant to be a supplemental mechanism to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and this United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) site offers an overview of the treaty. The CTBT would be one of the global community's best defenses against illicit proliferation of nuclear weapons, but due to many objections and contentious clauses, many Member States refuse to become party to the CTBT.

United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. (2002). *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)*. Retrieved June 17, 2009, from <http://www.un.org/events/npt2005/background.html>

This is a United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) site that describes the history of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT is the seminal document as far as nuclear non-proliferation is considered in the international community and if it were followed as it was intended, nuclear proliferation would be a much less important topic. UNODA gives a treaty status link as well as related documents and news to the NPT.

United Nations Security Council. (2008). *Membership of the Security Council: About the Council*. Retrieved June 17, 2009, from the UN website

<http://www.un.org/sc/members.asp>
This website is dedicated to the UNSC's structure. It shows how the Members are chosen (those outside of the

permanent five States), and how the UNSC functions within the UN. The UNSC website also details how the UNSC itself functions, its rules and structure.

Further Reading

GlobalSecurity.org. (2000). *Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): Dimona Negev Nuclear Research Center*. Retrieved June 17, 2009, from

<http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/israel/dimona.htm>

GlobalSecurity.org is a well-known site that provides information on all security related matters within the international community. This page provides an outline and chronology on the events that formed the Israeli Negev Nuclear Research Center at Dimona. Israel has long been suspected to possess nuclear weapons and the presence of the reactor at Dimona since 1958 leads many to believe that the state of Israel is home to a very sophisticated nuclear programme that extends beyond research.

Elaraby, N. (1996, May 28). *The Security Council and Nuclear Weapons*. Retrieved June 17, 2009, from

<http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/docs/elaraby.htm>



Dr. Elaraby's speech from an NGO working group on the UNSC focuses on the history and goals of the UN and non-proliferation. The speech calls for the UNSC to pass more resolutions dealing with nuclear weapons safeguards. Elaraby also talks about the need for stronger denuclearisation processes and the importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

